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THE ELECTRONIC COMMONWEALTH: THE IMPACT OF NEW MEDIA 
TECHNOLOGIES ON DEMOCRATIC POLITICS. By Jeffrey B. Abramson, 
F. Christopher Arterton, and Gary R. Orren. New York: Basic Books. 
1988. Pp. xvi, 331. $21.95. 
The Information Age is upon us, and among the many familiar 
things being transformed by communications technology is American 
politics. The Electronic Commonwealth, by Jeffrey B. Abramson, 1 F. 
Christopher Arterton, 2 and Gary R. Orren, 3 is the report of a three-
year study, sponsored by Harvard University's Institute of Politics, 
that evaluates the effect of "new media technologies" on politics and 
democracy in the United States. 
Professors Abramson, Arterton, and Orren establish three goals 
for their book: (1) to describe the ongoing technological transforma-
tion of our politics and government; (2) to evaluate the effect of these 
changes on American democracy; and (3) to propose legislative and 
regulatory reforms that would "reorient mass communications toward 
more robust democratic service ... " (p. 31). These goals are impor-
tant, but The Electronic Commonwealth falls short of satisfying them. 
Although the book describes the technological changes at work, it fails 
to analyze fully the implications of these changes or to offer a set of 
policy recommendations to match its descriptive and normative con-
clusions. The book, however, undertakes a much-needed discussion 
about the impact of communication technologies and how policymak-
ers can use communications policy to strengthen American 
democracy. 
The Electronic Commonwealth is brimming with anecdotes illus-
trating the many political uses of the new technologies, which include 
satellite broadcasting and satellite relays, computerized data bases and 
computer-generated mail, and campaign cable-casting.4 This account 
is interesting and informative, but just how widespread and how sig-
nificant are these developments? The book lacks statistical data, mak-
1. Associate Professor of Politics, Brandeis University. Professor Abramson is also the au-
thor of LIBERATION AND ITS LIMITS: THE MORAL AND PoLmCAL THOUGHT OF FREUD 
(1984). 
2. Dean of the Graduate School of Political Management, New York City. Professor 
Arterton has also written TELEDEMOCRACY: CAN TECHNOLOGY PROTECT DEMOCRACY? 
(1987) and MEDIA PoLmcs: THE NEWS STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1984). 
3. Associate Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and 
Associate Director of the Joan Shorenstein Center on Press, Politics, and Public Policy. His 
other books include: MEDIA AND MOMENTUM: THE NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY AND NOMI-
NATION PoLmcs (G. Orren & N. Polsby eds. 1987) and G. ORREN & s. VERBA, EQUALITY IN 
AMERICA: THE VIEW FROM THE TOP (1985). 
4. The book also discusses video equipment, "pay" television, low-power television, VHF 
"drop-in" stations, videotext, teletext, lasers, fiber optics, and other technologies. 
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ing it difficult for policymakers - clearly part of the book's intended 
audience - to evaluate the true significance of the changes. 
The authors aim to do more than merely describe the new technol-
ogies, though; they strive to evaluate the effect of these technologies on 
democratic government. The book chronicles a "steady parallel" (p. 
67) between technological change and political development in the 
United States. The authors conclude that television has contributed to 
the development. of a political system where direct primary elections 
have largely supplanted political parties in selecting party nominees, 
where voters "increasingly behave like atomized individuals" (p. 87), 
and where political consultants use polling and direct mail to target 
voters and win support for candidates and special interest policies. 
These changes, they argue, have pushed the United States toward 
"electronic plebiscitary d,emocracy."5 Their fear of this perceived de-
velopment drives their ~alysis throughout the book. 
In the preface, the authors express a strong commitment to the 
c~rrent state of civil liberties in the United States, calling the achieve-
ment of these liberties "heroic, even epic" and "the distinctive Ameri-
can ~ontribution to the meaning of liberty . . . whose importance 
cam1ot be overstated" (p. xiii). They strong~y favor democratic plural-
ism over plebiscitary or communitarian democracy because they be-
lieve it best guarantees these liberties. 6 Pluralism, they assert, fosters 
group identities, but safeguards civil liberties better than the "crudely 
majoritarian" plebiscite and avoids the exclusionary aspects of 
communitarianism. 7 
5. The phrase comes from an editorial in the The New Republic, which the authors quote at 
length: 
The most striking feature of • . . electronic plebiscitary democracy is direct, continuous, 
highly intense communication between Presidents (and would-be Presidents) at one end, 
and scores of millions of people at the other. The politicians reach the people via television; 
the people reach the politicians via polls. . . . The people act almost solely in their capacity 
as atomized individual television-watchers, and scarcely at all in their capacity as citizens of 
states and communities or members of political parties or other voluntary associations. 
Pp. 90-91 (quoting The Electronic Plebiscite, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 29, 1981, at 8). Not 
surprisingly, The New Republic has praised The Electronic Commonwealth. See Sound-Bite De-
mocracy, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 12, 1988, at 7, 8. 
6. See pp. 19-31. The authors describe pluralism as democracy "based on the principle of 
free competition among groups" but without a "classical conception of the common good." P. 
27. Communitarian democracy, which recalls the virtues of the New England town meeting, 
uses citizen participation, deliberation, and persuasion to reorient politics toward the "common 
good." Pp. 22-26. Plebiscitary democracy is essentially direct democracy, and is characterized 
by primaries and referenda, and, less officially, by public opinion polls. Pp. 19-22. 
7. Pp. 22, 25-26. The authors presuppose a link between pluralism and representative gov-
ernment- "an arrangement," they candidly admit, "whereby elites 'acquire the power to decide 
by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.'" P. 19 (quoting Schumpeter, Democ-
racy as Elite Competition, in FRONTIERS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 40 (H. Karie! ed. 1970)). 
The Electronic Commonwealth contains little discussion of the constitutional separation of pow-
ers and the role of the courts in safeguarding individual liberties from majorities. Thus, the role 
of these institutions in offsetting the troubling aspects of communitarian and plebiscitary democ-
racy is not explored. 
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The authors, however, also feel that American politics suffers from 
selfishness and alienation. They believe in the existence of a "common 
good" that is something more than pluralism's "group warfare" (p. 
27) or plebiscitary democracy's sum of atomized individual prefer-
ences. They finesse the conflict between individual freedom and the 
politics of community by defining the "public good" that unites us as 
nothing more than our joint commitment to democratic process. They 
call this vision of democracy "pluralism with a communitarian face" 
(p. 30), but it is a highly individualistic and implicitly elitist deµioc-
racy, one with a razor-thin view of community. 8 This view limits both 
their diagnosis of what's wrong with our current democratic system 
and their proposals for policy reform. 
Given their preferences, it is not surprising that the authors advo-
cate more "civic education" ~long with efforts to inc!ease citizen par-
ticipation in government (pp. 210-14). Such "education" presumably 
would include teaching that many value choices are out-of-pouµds for 
majoritarian decisionmaking because they infringe on individual liber-
ties. The authors try to mask these elitist concerns, but th~ir anxiety 
emerges clearly, as expressed in a quote from Ithiel de Sola Pool: "If 
citizens are brought, by effective personal participation, to the point of 
caring very deeply about political outcomes, then ther~ had better not 
be too many important decisions, for every time one is made there are 
losers as well as winners. "9 
Direct participatory democracy - from primaries and referenda 
to polls and instant voting via television - is bad, the authors argue, 
because it promotes selfishness and alienation. One suspects, however, 
that lurking behind this opposition to plebiscites is a concern that di-
rect forms of participation might be used to raise economic and social 
issues that cautious representative governments often avoid. 10 Kristin 
Luker's study of California pro-life activists, 11 cited in The Electronic 
Commonwealth (pp. 126-27, 160), suggests what its authors may have 
to fear. Luker reported that new and inexpensive technology enabled 
low- and middle-income women, groups with traditionally low partici-
8. The ideal of democracy embraced by the authors has been criticized by other theorists. 
See, e.g., A. MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE (1981); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF 
JUSTICE (1982); see also B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY FOR 
A NEW AGE (1984). 
9. P. 61 (quoting de Sola Pool, Citizen Feedback in Political Philosophy, in TALKING BACK: 
CmZEN FEEDBACK AND CABLE TECHNOLOGY 244 (I. de Sola Pool ed. 1973)). 
10. The ballot initiative has been used increasingly to place controversial social issues and 
populist economic proposals onto the public agenda. In 1988, for example, Michigan voters 
approved a referendum that would ban state funding of abortions except to save the life of the 
mother. In addition, California voters adopted a plan to reduce automobile insurance rates by 20 
percent. A second California referendum, which failed, sought to require that doctors and hospi-
tals report positive test results for the AIDS virus to state health officials. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 
1988, § 1, at 13, col. 1. 
11. K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE PoLmCS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984). 
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pation rates, to become more politically active in the pro-life move-
ment.12 The authors seem ambivalent about this greater involvement, 
perhaps because these new activists pressed for a rollback of one of the 
civil liberties they seem committed to preserving. 
The authors' preoccupation with the dangers of more direct polit-
ical participation 13 distracts them from thoughtful consideration of the 
very real problems with the current level and quality of participation 
in the United States. For example, they repeatedly attribute low rates 
of political participation to a lack of citizen interest in politics (pp. 41, 
97). They never document this assertion, however, and even ignore 
some of their own hopeful evidence to the contrary.14 
The authors also ignore contradictory evidence about the level of 
citizen interest in public affairs. They discount the value of local news 
programs (as much as three hours each weekday in many places) and 
ignore the boom both in talk shows built around news and social 
trends (many with call-in opportunities) and in entertainment-oriented 
news programs (often about controversial topics). 15 Such programs 
indicate greater public interest in current events than the authors' nar-
row definition of "public affairs" programming will admit. In their 
rush to blame the victim, the authors never consider the possibility 
that their vision of modern liberal democracy (essentially the Ameri-
can status quo) places too many value choices outside the bounds of 
majoritarian decisionmaking and thereby removes from the political 
sphere too much of what makes political participation meaningful to 
people. 
The Electronic Commonwealth, finally, is a disappointing guide for 
policymakers. The authors decry the current state of American de-
mocracy, but they fail to recommend a set of policy reforms to match 
12. A "rollover" feature on the pro-life organization's telephone, which switched incoming 
calls to volunteers working at home, facilitated the group's activism. Home computers stored 
mail and telephone lists for generating letters to Congress. Arrangements with banks allowed 
donors to have $5 or $10 automatically transferred to the organization each month, providing 
the group with a stable financial base. The result of all this was that the women were able to 
participate primarily fro~ home. They attended only four meetings a year, instead of ten, the 
average for this kind of group. Pp. 126-27 (citing K. LUKER, supra note 11). 
13. The authors overreact to arguments made by advocates of more direct democracy, in 
particular futurists John Naisbitt and Alvin Tofller and democratic theorist Benjamin Barber. 
They give too much credence to the forecasts of Naisbitt and Toffier, who have declared repre-
sentative government "obsolete." Pp. 164-65 (quoting J. NAISBITI, MEGATRENDS: TEN NEW 
DIRECTIONS TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES (1982) and A. TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE (1980)), 
While the authors draw on Barber's ideas, they do so selectively. See B. BARBER, supra note 8. 
14. The book, for example, cites a study showing that, of homes receiving C-SPAN, the cable 
public affairs channel, five percent watched more than twenty hours per month. An additional 
thirteen percent of the homes watched between five and twenty hours per month, while another 
twenty percent watched between one and five hours per month. P. 143. 
15. Contemporary affairs interviewers include Oprah Winfrey, Phil Donohue, and Sally Jessy 
Raphael. CNN has Sonya Friedman and Larry King. C-SPAN, meanwhile, devotes several 
hours daily to call-in interviews with newsmakers and journalists. See generally Scardino, A 
Debate Heats Up: Is It News or Entertainment?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1989, § 2, at 29, col. 1. 
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their diagnosis. The book offers few concrete proposals. Its policy 
chapters, furthermore, focus primarily on cable television and neglect 
the other "new media,'' which were the subject of much of the earlier 
discussion. 
The authors explore the history of two competing first amendment 
values: autonomy and access (pp. 239-73). Press autonomy, the older 
of the two values, has been enshrined as the primary first amendment 
concern. Access, the newer value, has never received full protection 
because regulation would be needed to police such a right. Opponents 
of government regulation of the media raise the spectre of manipula-
tion and censorship, 16 but regulation is not inherently evil. The Elec-
tronic Commonwealth makes this point nicely by analyzing two 
foreign media systems: Great Britain's government-owned and oper-
ated British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) (pp. 198-202) and the 
less well-known Dutch system (pp. 202-08). 
In the Netherlands, the government owns the transmitters, but pri-
vate, independent groups produce eighty percent of the programming. 
These groups tend to be organized along religious and political lines. 
Air time is allocated by a government agency using a formula that 
measures group membership and audience size.17 The Dutch model is 
reported as an example of how a broadcast system might be structured 
to reinforce pluralist diversity. The British model, in contrast, empha-
sizes citizen education and promotes communitarian democracy. De-
spite their shortcomings, 18 these two different broadcast systems 
demonstrate that government involvement can promote democratic 
values. 
The United States, of course, has a very different system, "the most 
laissez-faire broadcasting in the world" (p. 197). The authors convinc-
ingly recite the negative effects on democracy of private ownership and 
control of the media. The desire to build a mass audience drives pri-
16. See, e.g., L. POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 121-41 
(1988) (recounting President Richard Nixon's numerous efforts to intimidate and obtain more 
favorable coverage from the three major broadcast networks). Advocates of government inter-
vention to reduce inequalities in access respond that Powe and others are overly concerned about 
the danger of government manipulation and give too little weight to the negative effects of com-
mercial control on.access and diversity. See, e.g., Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manip-
ulation of Consent (Book Review), 93 YALE L.J. 581 (1984); Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 781, 787-90 (1987). 
17. Pp. 202-08. The law allots 70 percent of broadcast time to organizations with member-
ship of 150,000 or more. Ten percent of air time is distributed to minority groups, including 
charities and emerging political movements, and tlie final 20 percent is filled with government 
programming. 
18. The BBC has been the target of some controversial government attempts at censorship, 
notably an effort in 1985 to ban a program that featured an interview with an Irish Republican 
Army spokesman. Pp. 230-31. The Dutch example shows that even public ownership and subsi-
dized access will not entirely eliminate the incentive to maximize audience share with entertain-
ment. New independent groups that emphasize entertainment are drawing an increasingly large 
audience share. Pp. 204, 221. 
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vate broadcasters to pref er entertainment over public affairs program-
ming and to avoid political controversy.19 
Private control of the media in the United States is entrenched, but 
the rise of cable has reopened the debate over the merits of greater 
public control. Cable has revived the push for broadcast deregulation 
because its multi-channel carrying capacity seems to deprive the cur-
rent regulatory system of its original justification: channel scarcity. 
Yet as the authors recognize, even if the scarcity rationale fails,20 the 
stifling effect of private ownership on the discussion of public issues 
will continue to justify some form of regulation. 2 1 
Paradoxically, given its almost unlimited carrying capacity, cable 
television raises new concerns about access and programming diver-
sity. As an incentive to undertake the large economic investment 
needed to wire an entire community, municipalities grant cable opera-
tors near-total control over the programs they carry, requiring only 
the set-aside of a few channels for "public access." This arrangement 
has worked reasonably well, but the courts22 and, more recently, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (pp. 261-62), have cast 
doubt on the ability of local communities to exact even such minimal 
concessions from cable franchisees. 
The authors lean toward regulating cable operators as "common 
carriers," with channels sold on a nondiscriminatory basis to the high-
est bidders and with limits on the number of channels any owner can 
control (pp. 265-68). In 1984, Congress passed the Cable Communi-
19. Pp. 284-90. These arguments are not new. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 16, at 788; see also 
CBS v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[I]n light of 
the strong interest of broadcasters in maximizing their audience, and therefore their profits, it 
seems almost naive to expect the majority of broadcasters to produce the variety and controver-
siality of material necessary to reflect a full spectrum of viewpoints."). 
20. Scarcity probably never was the strongest argument for broadcast regulation. See, e.g., 
L. PowE, supra note 16. For a response which argues that, despite cable and other new outlets, 
scarcity remains a valid justification for media regulation, see Carter, supra note 16, at 598. 
21. Pp. 28-29. Here, again, the authors follow a large body of scholarship. See, e.g. Barron, 
Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Bollinger, 
Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass 
Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976); Carter, supra note 16; and Fiss supra note 16. 
22. In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979), the Supreme Court struck down a 
Federal Communications Commission regulation requiring cable systems with more than 3,500 
subscribers to set aside from one to four channels for educational, local government, and "public 
access" purposes. The Co~rt skirted the constitutional question, but held that the FCC lacked 
statutory authority to impose such rules. In Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 829, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
rejected the scarcity rationale for ~~gulation and struck down restrictions on cable pay program-
ming on first amendment grounds, stating that "nothing in the record ... suggest[s] a constitu-
tional distinction between.cable television and newspapers .... " If endorsed by the Supreme 
Court, this reasoning could spund the death-knell of cable "public access" requirements as well. 
See pp. 251-52 (discussing these cases); see also Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 
(D.C. Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986) (striking down on first amendment grounds 
"must-carry" rules, which required cable operators to transmit to subscribers all local over-the-
air broadcast signals). 
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cations Policy Act,23 which imposed some common carrier require-
ments on cable operators. Cablecasters, however, claim that these 
requirements are constitutionally invalid, and the federal courts seem 
sympathetic to this argument.24 
Ironically, the American liberal dedication to press autonomy and 
private control provides much of the intellectual materiel for profit-
minded media programmers seeking to shrug off government regula-
tion. The authors of The Electronic Commonwealth are not insensitive 
to this irony, stating: 
Praise of press autonomy can degenerate into a rather flippant identifica-
tion of the First Amendment with the politics of deregulation. Nowhere 
is this flippancy more apparent than in the self-serving invocations of the 
First Amendment and the autonomy tradition made by cable operators 
in defense of their right to control each and every one of their system's 
channels. [p. 273] 
In retreat from their early, unqualified endorsement of strong individ-
ual civil liberties, the authors thus argue: "[T]he First Amendment 
must make its peace with government regulation of programming con-
tent. . . . Nothing in the new technology itself convinces us that the 
need for government oversight of the prerogatives of private corporate 
power is now magically at an end" (p. 273). Yet the extent of cable 
regulation allowed by the first amendment is uncertain, and the au-
thors note that a Supreme Court ruling would do much to "clarify 
expectations" (p. 268). 
Abramson, Arterton, and Orren argue that an exclusive focus on 
press autonomy produces too little discussion of important public is-
sues. They believe that some government regulation of the new media 
is needed to modulate the forces of the market and to promote such 
discussion. Whatever the problems with the current regulatory struc-
ture, they state, deregulation is not the answer. 
The outlook for reform, however, is bleaker than the authors rec-
ognize. The market forces they identify will work against efforts to 
regulate or otherwise increase public control of the "new media." 
And the authors fail to consider a second key obstacle: the self-inter-
est of elected officials, who stand to lose from more vigorous debate of 
public issues and increased coverage of political challengers. 25 The 
stake that incumbents have in political coverage justifi~ a h~althy 
skepticism about media reform proposals that gain support in Con-
23. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 15, 18, 46, 
47, and 50 U.S.C.); see pp. 267-68. 
24. See supra note 22. 
25. In 1988, 98.5 percent (402 of 408) of the House incumbents who ran for reelection won. 
In the Senate races, 85 percent (23 of27) of those who sought reelection won. N.Y. Times, Nov. 
10, 1988, § 2, at 7, col. 1. These figures point to a troubling'lack of competition in congressional 
elections. 
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gress. 26 It may also help explain Congress's opposition to eliminating 
the Fairness Doctrine, which theoretically promotes public discussion, 
but which, in practice, probably stifles it. 27 
Since self-interest is at work not only in the private sector, but in 
Congress as well, the obstacles to pressing the new media into "more 
robust democratic service" (p. 31) are substantial. Nevertheless, 
would-be reformers have little choice but to work through elected offi-
cials. The FCC, which unilaterally abandoned the Fairness Doctrine 
in 1987, favors deregulation. And the courts, even were they more 
sympathetic to the problem of access, lack the expertise and institu-
tional structure needed to enact and oversee access-promoting 
reforms. 
The solutions that Abramson, Arterton, and Orren propose are 
neither specific enough, nor strong enough, to solve the problems they 
identify. The Electronic Commonwealth, however, performs a valua-
ble task. It may not provide all the answers, or even the right answers, 
but it nonetheless addresses a vitally important question: "[I]n an age 
of media giants of the ilk of CBS or Time, does the end value of a rich 
and robust public debate require government today to play an active 
role in legislating public access to the media" (p. 241)? 
- Gregory T. Everts 
26. A classic example is the "Clean Campaign Act," first introduced in 1985, when it was 
sponsored by a bipartisan group that included U.S. Senators Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.), Barry 
Goldwater (R-Ariz.), Paul Simon (D-III.), and John Danforth (R-Mo.). The proposal sought to 
require that political candidates appear in person when running advertisements that refer to their 
opponent. Purportedly, the plan was aimed at promoting more meaningful discussion, but it is 
no coincidence that it would have largely prohibited short, "negative" political spots, one of the 
few truly effective weapons in the challenger's campaign arsenal. See Simonian, FCC Watch: 
Hatchet Ads on the Block, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Summer 1985, at 61. 
27. See pp. 245-47 (discussing the FCC's repeal of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987 and the 
congressional opposition it triggered). 
